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COMMENT
STANDING IN THE WAY OF OUR GOALS:
HOW THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
(WHATEVER THAT MEANS) IS NEVER
REACHED IN TEXAS DUE TO LACK
OF STANDING FOR THIRD-PARTY PARENTS
by: Jessica Nation Holtman*
ABSTRACT
Currently in Texas, standing options for third-party nonparents seeking to
file suits affecting the parent-child relationship (“SAPCRs”) are extremely
limited. And, even though the standing options are codified, the evidence nec-
essary to meet the threshold elements may be drastically different depending
on the case’s location. These third parties, who have previously exercised pa-
rental responsibilities, must make showings to the court that most divorced
parents could not make; and this is just for a chance to bring a claim in court.
While this seems unfair, and Texas should absolutely resolve the split
among its appellate courts, there is one extremely important part that has yet
to be mentioned: the child. Standing determinations do not involve a best in-
terest of the child inquiry; this must be changed.
This Comment uses a San Antonio Court of Appeals case to highlight both
the Texas appellate-court split and the lack of a best interest of the child con-
sideration. Using the case’s facts, this Comment breaks down the general
third-party standing option by venue to show just how different the require-
ments are depending on where in Texas the party resides. In most cases, the
outcome spotlights that the child is the true victim of these standing limitations.
Professor James Dwyer explains that relationships have a far greater impact
on children than on adults. Courts should consider this when determining the
best interest of the child. More importantly, the best interest of the child should
be a primary consideration, not one that is considered after the plaintiff estab-
lishes standing. Allowing a third-party parent to file suit is highly likely to
serve the child’s best interest. Once judges apply the best-interest standard at
the appropriate stage, judges should then look through the child’s lens for
making recommendations on the child’s behalf.
Too few judges have said too few words about the lack of the best interest of
the child consideration when issuing standing determinations. But with our
nation’s evolving familial structure, the time has come to reconsider how
courts determine who may bring suits affecting children.
* J.D. Candidate, Texas A&M University School of Law, May 2018; B.A. in
Modern Languages, Texas A&M University, College Station, December 2006. The
Author wishes to thank her advisor, Judge Spurlock, II, for his invaluable advice and
guidance throughout the writing and editing process. She also wishes to thank her
family for their endless sacrifices and continuous support in law school. This Com-
ment is dedicated to the Author’s daughter, Grace, whose best interests are always
the Author’s driving force.
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“In my opinion, this is an issue that should be addressed by the
Legislature, and I would implore the Texas Legislature to do so.”1
—Justice Alvarez, 2016
I. INTRODUCTION
The Texas Family Code is a work of art. The code is intertwined
within itself, so that different sections depend on others for applica-
tion.2 This Article takes an in-depth look at Texas’s “public policy” in
one Code section and how courts never reach this policy for some
1. In re Sandoval, No. 04-15-00244-CV, 2016 WL 353010, at *5 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Jan. 27, 2016, no pet.)(mem. op.) (Alaverz, J., concurring).
2. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §162.001 (West Supp. 2017) (stating applica-
tion of this code section is subject to satisfying requirements from Chapter 102).
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families’ cases, because another Code section stops the courts in their
tracks. Specifically, courts are supposed to protect children’s rights,
yet they seemingly deem those rights inferior to state legislation.3
This causes problems. Maybe not for “traditional” families of yes-
teryear, but definitely for a specific type of modern family whose chil-
dren’s “parents” are neither biologically nor legally the parents, but
instead are mere third parties.4 The Texas Legislature says it wants the
courts’ primary consideration to be “[t]he best interest of the child.”5
But is the best interest of the child actually Texas’s primary considera-
tion if courts may deny a person acting as a “parent” an opportunity
to be heard because of severely limited options for meeting the state-
imposed standing threshold?
Furthermore, if a third party satisfies the Legislature’s strict time
requirements, but lives in certain parts of Texas, the court will still
deny standing due to additional judicially imposed restrictions, again
disregarding the best interest of the child. Generally, third parties can-
not show they have had “actual care, control, and possession”6 over a
child for overcoming the deeply rooted parental presumption.7 To
completely understand where Texas’s third-party guidelines originate,
Troxel v. Granville8 must be considered; only then can the Texas ap-
pellate-court split regarding that statutory phrase—“actual care, con-
trol, and possession”—be understood.9
Texas’s legislative ancestors gave the courts generous discretion for
tending to the best interest of the child.10 The Texas Legislature
should review the past and enact a standing option so that certain fac-
tual scenarios, like the one presented later in this Comment, become
an issue of the past.
However, if getting enough votes for a new standing option is too
difficult, the Legislature should, at the very least, provide a uniform
definition of “actual care, control, and possession.” Currently, stand-
ing requirements for third-party parents depend upon which side of a
county line they reside.11 This inconsistency only displays a division
within Texas that should not exist. Children’s access to their parents,
or those acting as parents, should not vary because of the county in
3. Id. at *4.
4. Joanna L. Grossman, Parentage Without Gender, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 717, 724–27 (2016) (discussing the ever-changing dynamic of our familial
structure and its effect on parentage laws).
5. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §153.001–.002 (West Supp. 2017).
6. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §102.003 (West Supp. 2017).
7. See discussion infra Section III.B.
8. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
9. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§102.003 (West Supp. 2017).
10. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §102.003 (cmt.) (West Supp. 2017).
11. HON. SCOTT BEAUCHAMP, THIRD PARTY STANDING AND SUBSTANTIVE RE-
LIEF, ADVANCED FAM. L. COURSE 12 (Aug. 2014) (Parents residing on one side of the
Tarrant–Dallas County line have different requirements for showing “actual custody,
control, and possession” than those residing on the other side.).
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which their parents reside. Every parent-child relationship in Texas
should be governed by the same rules and afforded the same
protections.
This Comment explores the “best interest of the child” standard
(“BIC”) and explains its priority in Texas. This Comment sheds light
on standing issues faced by specific third parties in Texas courts by
discussing a recent case from the San Antonio Court of Appeals. This
illustration will help illuminate the specific problems faced by third-
party parents who are not considered legal parents. Ultimately, this
Comment’s goal is to remind its readers that the children—who have
had their third-party parents ripped from their lives—are the victims
of Texas’s outdated legislation and case law. And this status quo over-
looks the children’s relational rights, or at the very least, pushes them
to the side.
With the evolution of our nation’s family-structure, the Legislature
must come to terms with the fact that the Texas Family Code is out-
dated, neither providing help to all “parents” seeking to care for their
children nor protecting children’s rights to have loving adult persons
care for them.
What, then, should Texas do? Redefining “parent” would likely fix
the issue entirely, but that requires altering decades of case law and
statutory framework. In the interim, perhaps supplying third-party
parents a more lenient standing option would suffice, until the law can
catch up with our evolving society. At the very least, “actual care, con-
trol, and possession” should be defined and applied so third-party par-
ents have a chance to fight for their children, allowing the courts to
apply their legislatively given, broad discretion.
Texas Legislature: Give the courts a way to use their “extraordina-
rily broad” discretion12 and provide them an avenue to help all types
of parents and children who seek the court’s help. Let the “best inter-
est of the child” and the child’s right to have certain adults care for
them truly be Texas’s primary concern by letting courts consider those
interests when determining standing.
II. IN RE SANDOVAL, GENERALLY
Once upon a time, a woman was in a relationship that worked so
well, she and her significant other decided to live together. Years into
their relationship, they adopted a child. Only the woman legally
adopted the baby, but both were there to witness the baby’s birth, and
both raised the child as their own.
Two years later, the woman adopted another newborn. The four
lived together as a family for almost ten years. Mom’s significant other
was “Dad,” and the children did not know differently. In fact, Mom
referred to Dad as the children’s father to friends, school officials, and
12. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §153.002 (cmt.) (West Supp. 2017).
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church officials. He supported them, provided for them, and cared for
them as his own. Dad even quit his job and became a stay-at-home
parent to take care of the children, who both had special needs.
However, as often happens, Mom and Dad eventually separated.
Initially, they reached an agreement regarding their children. The
agreement allowed Dad to stay active in their children’s lives, as he
always had before, even though he no longer lived in the same resi-
dence. Dad continued to care for the children before and after school,
as well as on the weekends.
Almost two years later, Mom realized she no longer wanted Dad in
her or their children’s lives; she informed Dad their agreement was
over, and she would not allow him further contact with their children.
Within a month, Dad sought the court’s help, filing a Petition to Adju-
dicate Parentage and a Motion for Temporary Orders.
These are the general facts of In re Sandoval,13 which perfectly dis-
play the issue presented in this Comment: the court never considered
the best interests of those children, and ultimately their relationship
rights, because the person seeking the court’s help was a third-party,
nonlegal parent.
The rights of both biological parents had been terminated, as is cus-
tomary with adopted children.14 The only difference between the peo-
ple who the children called “Mom” and “Dad” was that “Mom” had
filed paperwork with the State and legally adopted the children. Oth-
erwise, both adults successfully met the requirements of the best inter-
est of the child standard.15 Yet, only one was entitled to claim
themselves as a “legal” parent in Texas.16
In other words, because “Dad” had never been before the court
when raising those children, the courts are now punishing him by not
granting relief. According to the Texas Family Code, Dad was only a
third party and, as such, had extremely limited standing opportunities
for bringing a suit to fight for his children.
Moreover, depending on where Dad filed suit in Texas, even if
those extreme limitations were met, he still would not have had a
fighting chance, because he did not have “actual care, control, and
possession” over the children, as defined by jurisdictional Texas case
law. This Comment explores this specific issue further below.
13. In re N.I.V.S. and M.C.V.S., No. 04-14-00108-CV, 2015 WL 1120913, at *1
(Tex. App.—San Antonio March 11, 2015 (mem. op.)). Dad is transgender, and that,
in fact, is the reason he was not allowed to adopt either child. The Author mentions
this here because gender should not be the focus of a discussion concerning a right to
seek the Court’s help in maintaining relationships that are in the best interest of the
child. See infra note 85.
14. Id. at *1.
15. See id.
16. In re Sandoval, No. 04-15-00244-CV, 2016 WL 353010, at *5 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Jan. 27, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Alaverz, J., concurring).
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In re Sandoval is a prime example of how Texas children’s interests,
and their relationship rights, are overlooked, simply because those
persons acting as the children’s parents cannot comply with the strict
standards imposed by the Texas Legislature and case law for third-
party parents.
III. STANDING TO BRING SUITS IN TEXAS WHEN YOU ARE JUST A
THIRD WHEEL—AHEM—PARTY
The evolution of Texas’s standing requirements suggests Texas
holds the best interest of the child above all else.17 However, this has
not been the case in recent history, when Texas courts have halted
determinations regarding the best interest of the child because of lack
of standing.18
This reality is caused by the Texas Legislature and courts giving a
heavy deference to the Troxel opinion by placing more stringent pro-
tections on parental rights than Troxel requires in some situations.19
Judges are now taking it upon themselves in their opinions to request
change from the Legislature to help protect the interests of the child.20
A. Troxel v. Granville: Third-Party Standing as Applied to the
Constitution, Texas Style
Third-party standing cannot be discussed without an intimate view-
ing of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Troxel,21 as courts are to inter-
pret Texas standing statutes consistent with Troxel.22 However, as
discussed further below, the Texas Legislature and courts have placed
more stringent protections on parental rights than Troxel requires.23
Troxel is now seventeen years old and, as such, perhaps the dissenting
opinions should be re-examined, as each revealed problems nontradi-
tional families would face then, and in the future.24
1. The Plurality Opinion Left Holes
In Troxel, Isabelle and Natalia’s father exercised his weekend cus-
tody and possession at his parents’ home after separating from the
girls’ mother.25 This lasted approximately two years until, tragically,
17. See Bukovich v. Bukovich, 399 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. 1966).
18. See discussion infra Sections III.B.1–3.
19. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 11, at 5.
20. Sandoval, 2016 WL 353010, at *5.
21. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 11, at 4 (citing to Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
(2000)).
22. Id. at 6 (citing In re C.T.H.S. and C.R.H.S., 311 S.W. 3d 204, 208 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Apr. 29, 2010, pet. denied).
23. Id. at 5.
24. See Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third Parties to
Seek Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L. Q. 1 (Spring 2013).
25. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60–61 (2000).
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the girls’ father committed suicide.26 At first, the children visited with
their paternal grandparents, the Troxels, on the father’s same posses-
sion schedule.27 After a few months passed, however, the girls’ mother
informed the Troxels she wished to limit visitation to once per
month.28
The Troxels brought suit under a Washington state visitation statute
that gave any person the right to petition for visitation with a child at
any time and authorized the court to grant such rights if found to be in
the best interest of the child.29 The Troxels sought the court’s help in
overriding the mother’s wishes and imposing a visitation schedule pro-
viding them access to their deceased son’s children.30
The Washington Superior Court afforded the Troxels standing and
awarded them visitation rights.31 The mother appealed, the Washing-
ton Court of Appeals remanded for findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and the Superior Court found the Troxels’ visitation was in the
best interest of the children.32 However, the Court of Appeals re-
versed the visitation order, holding that the Troxels lacked standing,
as a pending custody action was necessary before the Troxels could
seek visitation;33 additionally, the Appellate Court was concerned
with the “constitutional restrictions on state interference with parents’
fundamental liberty interest[s]” in raising their children.34 The Troxels
petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for review, and that court
affirmed the appellate decision due to its concern of violating the Fed-
eral Constitution.35
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Washing-
ton Supreme Court’s decision, finding the statute unconstitutional.36
The court explained, “the Due Process Clause does not permit a State
to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing
decisions simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision
could be made.”37 Because of extensive precedent, the Due Process
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 61.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 62.
34. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
35. Id. at 62–63. The Washington Supreme Court felt there were two issues with
the statute: 1) the statute allowed state interference only to prevent harm to a child,
and that harm had not occurred in this case; and 2) the statute “swe[pt] too broadly”
in allowing any person to bring suit, which infringed on parents’ constitutional rights
to raise their children. Id. at 63.
36. See id. at 73.
37. Id. at 72–73; see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (Due
Process Clause “provides heightened protection against government interference with
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”); see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (Due Process Clause protects parents’ in establishing a home, bringing up
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Clause undoubtedly protects parents’ rights to make decisions con-
cerning the care, custody, and control of their children.38
The Court reasoned that the presumption exists that a fit parent
acts in the best interest of the child.39 The Court also reasoned that
States should not interfere into the private realm of family matters by
questioning the fitness of a parent, without a showing that the parent
inadequately cared for the child.40
However, the Court stated the issue was not that the Washington
Superior Court intervened but that it gave no weight to the mother’s
decision regarding the girls’ best interests.41 In deciding the best inter-
est of the child, Troxel requires a court to provide protection for par-
ents’ fundamental constitutional right to make decisions about raising
their child;42 but is this presumption rebuttable?
The Court did not consider this question directly but provided
string cites to varying state court decisions and statutes.43 The Court
did not hold that nonparent visitation statutes were per se unconstitu-
tional, nor did the court elicit the exact scope of this fundamental right
in the visitation context.44 Moreover, the Court noted that the mother
never sought to end visitation with the grandparents completely but
merely sought to restrain it.45
What will future courts consider concerning third-party standing
when, for example, the parent ceases visitation with the third party
entirely, as in In re Sandoval? Should a legal parent have the ability to
terminate an established relationship with a third party acting as a
parent, relying entirely on the weight of the parental presumption?
These are a few holes left by the Troxel plurality opinion that the dis-
senting Justices critiqued.
children, and controlling their education); see Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925) (“The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.”).
38. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). These cases gener-
ally discussed and described the fundamental interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child.
39. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68.
40. Id. at 68–69.
41. Id. at 69.
42. Id. at 69–70.
43. Id. at 70.
44. Id. at 73.
45. Id. at 71.
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2. The Dissenting Justices: Future Problem Solving at Its Best—If
Only Their Advice Had Been Heeded
“There is at a minimum a third individual, whose interests are im-
plicated in every case to which the statute applies—the child.”46
—Justice Stevens, 2000
The dissenting Justices raised the exact scenario this Comment ad-
dresses: courts disregarding the best interest of the child because of
standing limitations. Each dissent raised a different reason Troxel
could create that scenario.47 Because Texas’s requirements are more
stringent than Troxel’s,48 relationships between third-party parents
and their children are at risk.
Justice Stevens’s dissent focused on the Washington Supreme
Court’s flawed federal constitutional analysis, specifically “that the
Federal Constitution requires a showing of actual or potential ‘harm’
to the child before a court may” override a parent’s objections.49 Even
though, as Justice Stevens stated, our Federal Constitution contains no
such requirement,50 the Texas Legislature requires a showing of
“harm” for some third-party parents establishing standing.51
Further, Justice Stevens argued that constitutional protections of
parental rights are not absolute and have limits.52 Parental rights were
created from the assumption that the Court must balance parental in-
terest in a child against not only the State’s interest as parens patriae,53
but also “critically, the child’s own complementary interest in preserv-
ing relationships that serve her welfare and protection.”54
Moreover, Justice Stevens cautioned that this constitutional protec-
tion “should not be extended to prevent the States from protecting
children against the arbitrary exercise of parental authority that is not
in fact motivated by an interest in the welfare of the child.”55  Justice
Stevens explained that our society’s ever-changing familial relation-
ships strongly oppose a constitutional rule treating biological parents’
constitutional liberty interest in their children “as an isolated right
that may be exercised arbitrarily.”56
46. Id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. See id. at 80–103.
48. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 11, at 5.
49. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 85–86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
51. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 11, at 17–18 (discussing standing under §102.004(a)).
52. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. Parens Patriae is a doctrine by which a government has standing to prosecute a
lawsuit on a citizen’s behalf, especially on behalf of someone who is under a legal
disability to prosecute the suit. Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
54. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In addition to Justice Stevens’s dissent, Justice Kennedy’s dissent
expressed concern that the holding would allow parents to arbitrarily
deprive children of relationships with primary caregivers who are not
the biological parents.57 He opined that the holding stemmed from the
assumption that third parties seeking visitation have no legitimate, es-
tablished relationship with the child and that the parents have been
the child’s primary caregivers.58 In Justice Kennedy’s view, this hold-
ing would apply a “traditional” family standard to every family-law
case, no matter a case’s diversity.59
He stated, “[T]his is simply not the structure or prevailing condition
in many households. . . . For many [children] a traditional family with
two or even one permanent and caring parent is simply not the reality
of their childhood.”60 Justice Kennedy did agree with the Washington
Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that preexisting relationships with
third parties may “be so enduring that ‘in certain circumstances . . .
arbitrarily depriving the child of the relationship could cause severe
psychological harm to the child.’”61 Justice Kennedy rightly added
that third-party parents may also be harmed if these relationships are
terminated.62
Two decades later, case law shows the dissenting Justices were, un-
fortunately, correct. The In re Sandoval court allowed a legal adoptive
parent to arbitrarily extinguish a healthy, loving relationship between
the children and the only person they knew as “Dad.”63 One concur-
ring Justice of the In re Sandoval court felt Dad could have reached
the court using Texas Family Code section 102.003(a)(9) to maintain
standing.64 But as the following analysis will show, it is very unlikely
this would have worked, unless the case occurred in the right part of
Texas.
B. Third-Party Standing Options for Maintaining Suits Affecting
Children Post Troxel: The Texas Appellate-Court Split
The Texas courts and legislature have given Troxel substantial def-
erence and, in doing so, have filled some holes Justice O’Connor left
open.65 By taking Troxel a few steps further, Texas has placed more
stringent protections on parental rights than the United States Su-
preme Court requires and, thus, have made it even more difficult for
57. Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 98 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)).
61. Id. at 99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash. 2d
1, 20 (Wash. 1998)).
62. Id.
63. See discussion supra Section II.
64. In re Sandoval, No. 04-15-00244-CV, 2016 WL 353010, at *6 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Jan. 27, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (Alaverz, J., concurring).
65. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 11, at 5.
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children to maintain relationships with third parties acting as
parents.66
Nevertheless, establishing standing in an original suit affecting the
parent-child relationship in Texas is a threshold issue.67 Standing pa-
rameters in the Texas Family Code must be pled sufficiently, or the
court must dismiss the suit.68 Third parties, in particular, have ex-
tremely limited options available.
The limits imposed by the Texas Legislature begin with the defini-
tions of “parent.” These include: “the mother, a man presumed to be
the father, a man legally determined to be the father, a man who has
been adjudicated to be the father by a court of competent jurisdiction,
a man who has acknowledged his paternity under applicable law, or
an adoptive mother or father.”69 In other words, Texas does not con-
sider a person a “parent” unless that person is biologically the child’s
parent, or the court has named that person an adoptive parent.
This is problematic as our nation’s family dynamics evolve, because
litigants seeking conservatorship of children do not always fit those
statutory definitions.70 Specifically, third parties acting as “parents”
may be unable to meet Texas courts’ interpretations of the Family
Code’s requirements. Thus, no matter the exceptional quality of the
parenting skills shown, courts will deny third parties relief.
The Family Code’s primary source for standing is section
102.003(a), which details fourteen delineations for maintaining a
suit.71 Third parties, who are not biologically related to a child and do
not have the biological parent’s consent to maintain a suit, may use
only the following two options:
[1] a person, other than a foster parent, who has had actual care,
control, and possession of the child for at least six months ending
not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the peti-
tion; [and]
[2] a person with whom the child and the child’s guardian, manag-
ing conservator, or parent have resided for at least six months end-
ing not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the
petition if the child’s guardian, managing conservator, or parent is
deceased at the time of the filing of the petition.72
This Comment focuses on the first subsection (or, subsection nine of
section 102.003). A standing determination under this section is fact
66. Id.
67. ELIZABETH M. BOSEK, et. al, 40A TEX. JUR. 3D FAM. L. §1913 (Westlaw 2016)
(citing In re A.M., 312 S.W.3d 76 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. denied)).
68. Id. (citing In re A.M., 312 S.W.3d 76 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. de-
nied); In re M.K.S.-V., 301 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied)).
69. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §101.024(a) (West Supp. 2017).
70. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 11, at 4; see supra text accompanying notes 54–58.
71. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §102.003(a) (West Supp. 2017).
72. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§102.003(a)(9), (11) (West Supp. 2017).
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specific and determined on a case-by-case basis.73 This sounds simple
enough, but, unfortunately for Texans, the appellate courts disagree
about what facts are sufficient for determining “actual care, control,
and possession.”74 This appellate-court split creates inconsistencies for
parties residing on either side of certain county lines, but the Texas
Supreme Court has granted certiorari on this issue.75
However, the Court has said the lower courts should not be “mech-
anistic” when analyzing standing under this section of the Family
Code.76 Additionally, the lower courts cannot engraft additional statu-
tory requirements under the guise of interpreting a statute,77 but
should “rely on the plain meaning of the text, unless a different mean-
ing is supplied by legislative definition or is apparent from context, or
unless such a construction leads to absurd results.”78
Whether the appellate courts are legislating from the bench is not
the topic of this Article; but, if contiguous county judges are applying
different tests pursuant to the same statute, is there due process of
law?79 In an attempt to answer this question, presented below are the
appellate courts’ disagreements surrounding the phrase “actual care,
control, and possession.” The general categories of disagreement are:
1) relinquishment of parental rights; 2) duration, place, and schedule
of possession; and 3) control, “legal,” or “actual.”80
This Comment will apply and analyze In re Sandoval’s facts for a
more comprehensive understanding of the differing case law. It will
also analyze whether Justice Alvarez—the concurring justice in In re
Sandoval—was correct in her assertion that Dad could have main-
tained standing under Family Code section 102.003(a)(9) had he filed
suit within sixty days of Mom and Dad’s separation.
73. See In re M.P.B., 257 S.W.3d 804, 808–09 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.).
74. LISA HOPPES, GRANDPARENT, STEP PARENT, SAME SEX PARTNER AND THIRD
PARTY STANDING AND ACCESS ISSUES, STATE BAR OF TEXAS, MARRIAGE DISSOLU-
TION INSTITUTE 2 (Aug. 2014), http://www.texasbarcle.com/Materials/Events/12848/
162835.pdf [http://perma.cc/P3WC-C6VN].
75. In re H.S., No. 02-15-00303-CV, 2016 WL 4040497 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2016, pet. granted Sept. 1, 2017) (mem. op.).
76. Jones v. Fowler, 969 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam).
77. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 80–81 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Duncan, Wyatt & Co. v.
Taylor, 63 Tex. 645, 649 (1885)) (“We have no right to engraft upon the statute any
conditions or provision not placed there by the legislature.”).
78. Jasek v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 348 S.W. 3d 523, 528 (2011) (cit-
ing City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625–26 (Tex. 2008)).
79. This Article does not answer this question. It is proposed only to trigger the
thought of fairness and equality whilst reading what follows.
80. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 11, at 12; Hoppes, supra note 74, at 2. Associate
Judge Beauchamp and Lisa Hoppes’s “disagreement” categories and brief analysis
are used, but more thorough discussions of the cases are presented as to provide a
more complete understanding of current Texas case law.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-3\TWL302.txt unknown Seq: 13 10-MAY-18 16:21
2018] STANDING IN THE WAY OF OUR GOALS 575
1. Relinquishment of Parental Rights
In determining “actual care,” certain courts consider whether par-
ents have abdicated their parental rights to a third party.81 Generally,
the Beaumont/Fort Worth appellate courts have said “actual care” by
a third party requires that the parent relinquish parental responsibili-
ties to the third party.82
Many Texas appellate courts have held that a third party, who re-
sides with a parent and a child for the requisite time period, does not
gain standing by providing care to the child while the parent is still
doing so; there must be exclusivity.83
In In re M.J.G., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals rejected the
grandparents’ standing claim because the parents had not abdicated
their parental duties.84 There, the children and parents lived in the
grandparents’ home.85 Even though the grandparents “performed
day-to-day caretaking duties for the children,” there was no evidence
the parents had relinquished their parental duties and responsibilities
to the grandparents, nor that there was exclusivity in caring for the
children.86 Thus, the grandparents could not maintain they had “ac-
tual care, control, and possession” of the children for purposes of
meeting Family Code section 102.003(a)(9)’s requirements.87
Similarly, in In the Interest of C.T.H.S. and C.R.H.S., the Beaumont
Court of Appeals found that allowing standing without relinquish-
ment would render Family Code section 102.003(a)(11) meaningless,
as the requirement that the parent be deceased would be without ef-
fect since standing would separately exist under section
102.003(a)(9).88 In that case, two women conceived by artificial insem-
ination and proactively requested the court’s involvement early on in
establishing that each had rights to the twins born from that insemina-
tion.89 Unfortunately, some five years later when the mothers sepa-
rated, the appellate court determined that the joint Agreed Order was
void.90 The Court reasoned that the mothers submitted the request
too early (the twins were a mere four months old at the time of filing
of the joint SAPCR).91
81. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 11, at 12.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. In re M.J.G., 248 S.W.3d 753, 758–59 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.).
85. Id. at 758.
86. Id. at 758–59.
87. Id. at 759.
88. In re C.T.H.S. and C.R.H.S., 311 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010,
pet. denied) (per curiam).
89. In re Smith, 262 S.W.3d 463, 465 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. denied).
90. Id. at 469.
91. Id.
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The Court explained that the nonbiological mother did not have
standing to bring the joint SAPCR,92 nor the subsequent modification
request: 1) the biological mother did not totally relinquish parental
responsibilities to the nonbiological mother, even though they had
coparented the twins for five years in the same household; and 2) both
mothers had cared for the children, but Texas case law regarding
third-party standing requires that care, control, and possession be ex-
clusive from the biological parent.93
On the other side of the appellate-court spectrum (referenced here
as the Dallas/Austin line of cases), courts have relied heavily on the
concept that a child may have more than one place of residence. The
courts have found third-party standing where relinquishment of pa-
rental rights was lacking, but the third party fully participated.94
In In re Fountain, the First Court of Appeals in Houston stated that
nothing in section 102.003(a)(9) requires exclusivity of parental re-
sponsibility.95 In that case, two women had cared for an infant boy, at
the direction of his biological father, for approximately two years.96
As circumstances with the child evolved, the women discussed adopt-
ing the child to avoid foster-care placement.97 For a quicker adoption
process, only one woman became the child’s legal parent at that
time.98 Still, the court found that the nonparent woman had “devel-
oped a significant relationship with the child” and “invested signifi-
cant time raising and caring for the child,” and thus, met the statutory-
time requirements for section 102.003(a)(9) standing.99
The In re Fountain court distinguished itself from the Beaumont/
Fort Worth appellate courts discussed above, noting that the Legisla-
ture did not impose an exclusivity requirement.100  Most notably, the
In re Fountain court specifically restated the lower court’s conclusion
that it was “in the child’s best interest for [the nonparent woman] to
be able to proceed with her [suit].”101
92. The children were not yet six-months old, thus she could not have had stand-
ing through Family Code section 102.003(a)(9) as it requires the third party to have
had care, control, and possession for at least six months prior to filing suit. Id. at
466–67.
93. In re C.T.H.S. and C.R.H.S., 311 S.W.3d at 206–07.
94. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 11, at 12.
95. In re Fountain, No. 01-11-00198-CV, 2011 WL 1755550, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] May 2, 2011, no pet.) (op. on rehearing) (citing Smith v. Hawkins,
No. 1-09-00060-CV, 2010 WL 3718546, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 23,
2010, pet. filed) (mem. op.)).
96. Id. at *1.
97. Id.
98. Id. At the time of this case, adoption by both same-sex partners was impossi-
ble. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §162.001 cmt. 10 (West 2014).
99. In re Fountain, 2011 WL 1755550, at *2.
100. Id. at *4.
101. Id. at *3.
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In In re Y.B., K.B., and T.B., the San Antonio Court of Appeals
also did not require a third-party parent to show exclusivity.102 The
Court found facts sufficient to maintain standing for the third party:
the children thought of the third party as their father, the third party
lived with the children and the mother for over six months, and the
third party substantially interacted with the children.103
If the In re Sandoval court subjected the dad in that case to the
Beaumont/Fort Worth test, he too would have failed in maintaining
suit for the exact same reasons as the In re C.T.H.S. & C.R.H.S.
nonbiological mom. The adoptive mother in In re Sandoval had not
relinquished all parenting responsibilities to Dad, nor could Dad es-
tablish actual care, control, and possession of the children exclusive of
the adoptive mother.104
When applying the Dallas/Austin case law to In re Sandoval’s facts,
the Dad may have passed this portion of the “care, control, and pos-
session” test. Dad had developed a significant relationship with the
children and invested significant time raising and caring for the chil-
dren.105 Dad also showed that the children thought of him as their
father and that he lived with the children and the mother for almost a
decade.106
If only all courts would adopt a similar standard of determining
standing for third-party parents, perhaps all children could depend on
the court to protect their established relationships. Children need the
courts to protect them from parents who make arbitrary decisions
based on their animosity with the other party; but courts cannot do
this if Texas’s Legislature shuts the courtroom door on third-party
parents by not allowing them the opportunity to show their estab-
lished relationship with the children. And, unfortunately, additional
case law exists that further restricts third-party parents seeking the
courts’ help through Family Code section 102.003(a)(9).
2. Duration, Place, and Schedule of Possession
The Texas Family Code provides in section 102.003(b) that the trial
court “may not require that [section 102.003(a)(9)’s six-month posses-
sion period] be continuous and uninterrupted but shall consider the
child’s principal residence during the relevant time preceding the date
of commencement of the suit.”107 Texas appellate courts are then left
to decide how a residence becomes the “principal” residence by look-
ing at a three-element test: whether 1) the child has a “fixed place of
abode within the possession of the” petitioning party; 2) the residence
102. In re Y.B., 300 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied).
103. Id. at 4–5.
104. See discussion supra Section II.
105. See discussion supra Section II; In re Fountain, 2011 WL 1755550, at *2.
106. See discussion supra Section II; In re Y.B., 300 S.W.3d at 5.
107. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §102.003(b) (West Supp. 2017).
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is “occupied or intended to be occupied consistently over a substantial
period of time;” and 3) the residence “is permanent rather than
temporary.”108
The test’s third element concerning “permanency” is where the
Texas appellate courts differ. Case law tells us there are two ways of
establishing permanency: 1) “by presence in the county for an ex-
tended period of time,” or 2) “by some agreement, explicit or implied,
by the party with a right to control the child’s residence, for the child
to stay in the new county for an extended period of time.”109
In In re Kelso, the Fort Worth Appellate Court chose the second
method for establishing permanency and found the parent had not re-
linquished possession of the child since the parent still had control
over the time duration that the child could spend with the paternal
grandparents.110 As such, the grandparents’ residence was not the
child’s principal residence, and therefore, the grandparents did not es-
tablish standing to sue.111
The paternal grandparents kept the child for several months, includ-
ing major holidays, with minimal interruption by the mother.112 The
child saw a pediatrician in the grandparents’ county of residence, and
the grandparents paid for monthly full-time daycare with child sup-
port from the child’s father. Additionally, the baby sitter who watched
the child during the mother’s possession period testified that the child
had not spent “any substantial amount of time” in the mother’s care,
and, therefore, considered the mother’s time with the child
“temporary.”113
Nevertheless, the court latched onto the mother’s testimony that
she never intended to “let” the child reside with the grandparents, but
merely “let” the child visit.114 With this as its basis, the court deter-
mined the grandparents’ home was not the child’s “principal resi-
dence,” because the mother swore she never intended for it to be so,
and as such, the grandparents’ possession depended on her consent.115
Essentially, the court concluded that a third-party principal resi-
dence can only occur without parental consent, even though case law
tells us permanency is established “by some agreement, explicit or im-
plied, . . . for the child to stay in the new county for an extended
108. Snyder v. Pitts, 241 S.W.2d 136, 140 (Tex. 1951).
109. Doncer v. Dickerson, 81 S.W.3d 349, 361 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.)
(quoting In re S.D., 980 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet.
denied)).
110. In re Kelso, 266 S.W.3d 586, 590–91(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, orig.
proceeding).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 589–90.
113. Id. at 589.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 590–91.
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period of time.”116 It seems the court may have relied on “abdication
of parental rights” instead of actually applying the established “per-
manency” test provided by case law.
On the other hand, the Dallas Court of Appeals has applied an ex-
panded concept of third-party standing under section 102.003(a)(9) re-
garding “permanency,” almost in contradiction of In re Kelso.117 In In
the Interest of M.P.B., the Court found standing for a grandmother
who spent significant periods of time with the child and participated in
raising the child.118 The grandmother also provided evidence showing
the child had her own room at the grandmother’s house and had spent
every weekend of her life there until her mother’s death.119 There was
also testimony that the grandmother had clothed the child and taught
the child “ABC’s” and how to spell her name.120
The Court specifically noted that even though “Grandmother’s ac-
tual care, control, and possession of M.P.B. was not exclusive [and]
with Mother’s consent,” the grandmother satisfied all three elements
for establishing the grandmother’s home as the child’s principal resi-
dence.121 Specifically, the Court noted the record did not suggest that
the grandmother’s possession “was intended to be a temporary ar-
rangement to facilitate momentary housing difficulties, inconvenient
travel schedules, the pursuit of higher education, or the inability to
provide child care.”122 Thus, the Court granted the grandmother
standing to file an original suit requesting managing conservatorship
of M.P.B.123
In In re M.K.S.-V., the Dallas Court of Appeals again focused on
the permanency of possession and caregiver arrangements and found
a former same-sex partner had standing to sue for conservatorship.124
There, T.S., the biological birth mother of M.K.S.-V., arbitrarily dis-
continued the visits between M.K.S.-V. and K.V., her former same-sex
partner.125 The Court considered the child’s principal residence and
the fact that the arrangement between K.V. and T.S. closely resem-
116. See supra note 109.
117. Curiously, this is the case the In re Kelso court cited as its source. In re Kelso,
266 S.W.3d at 590.
118. In re M.P.B., 257 S.W.3d 804, 808–09 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.).
119. Id. at 809.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 809.
123. Id. at 809–10.  The court also explained that the Troxel holding did not require
a different conclusion, because there were “special circumstances warranting interfer-
ence with Father’s parental rights to primary care, custody, and control of M.P.B.” Id.
at 810 (citing In re Mays-Hooper, 189 S.W.3d 777, 777–78 (Tex. 2006)) (holding grand-
mother was not entitled to visitation because there was no evidence the mother was
unfit, the child’s well-being would suffer from minimized visitation with grandmother,
or that mother arbitrarily excluded grandmother’s access to the child)).
124. In re M.K.S.-V., 301 S.W.3d 460, 461 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
125. Id. at 462.
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bled a standard possession order.126 M.K.S.-V. had an established
presence at K.V.’s home, with her own room, including toys, movies, a
television, a sandbox and a slide set outside.127 The Court concluded
that “this pattern of possession and caregiving was [not] intended to
be a temporary arrangement . . . [and] evinced an intent” that M.K.S.-
V. would consistently occupy K.V.’s home over a substantial time
period.128
Neither of these principal-residence tests applied to the In re San-
doval Dad, as he resided with Mom and the children prior to Mom
and Dad’s separation, and the children never stayed at Dad’s house
after the separation.129
But, additional case law further restricts third-party parents seeking
the court’s help through section 102.003(a)(9). Sometimes “control”
does not just mean “control”—or does it?
3. Control: “Legal” or “Actual”
Courts have considered how “control” impacts the standing analysis
under section 102.003(a)(9). The Beaumont Court of Appeals rea-
soned that “control” must mean more than mere physical control, or
else the word “possession” in the same phrase would be superflu-
ous.130 In In re K.K.C., the Beaumont Court of Appeals commingled
“abdication of parental rights” with the requirement that “control” of
a child signifies “legal control.”131 The Court held the third-party peti-
tioner did not have standing, because the child’s parent had not relin-
quished “legal control” over the child.132 There, the parties and child
cohabitated as a family unit for almost seven years.133 The third-party
parent participated in supporting and disciplining the child, yet the
Court stated he “had no legal right of control over the child and no
authority to make decisions on behalf of the child.”134
The Court stated the word “control” means possession of the
“power or authority to guide and manage, and . . . make decisions of
legal significance for the child.”135 Additionally, the Court found that
“control” need not be exclusive to meet the requirements, but the
third party must have the legal authority to exert control over the
126. See supra note 108; In re M.K.S.-V., 301 S.W.3d at 464–65.
127. In re M.S.K.-V., 301 S.W.3d at 465.
128. Id.
129. See discussion supra Section II. The appellate opinions indicate Dad came to
Mom’s house to care for the children after school, in the mornings, and on the week-
ends, with no mention of the children ever going to Dad’s house. In re N.I.V.S. and
M.C.V.S., 2015 WL 1120913, at *1.
130. In re K.K.C., 292 S.W.3d 788, 792 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, orig.
proceeding).
131. Id. at 73.
132. Id.
133. Id at 791.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 793.
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child.136 However, because the child’s parent had not relinquished pa-
rental duties and obligations, the Court found that the third party
lacked standing to maintain the suit.137
Chief Justice Steve McKeithen, however, disagreed and wrote a dis-
senting opinion which stated, “[n]othing in the plain language of Sec-
tion 102.003(a)(9) excludes a person who shares the role of a parent
with the biological parent from having standing as a person with ‘ac-
tual care, control, and possession’ of the child.”138 Chief Justice McK-
eithen pointed out that neither “relinquishment” nor “abdication” is
in the plain language of the statute either.139 He ended with his most
powerful argument:
There is, however, a rational basis for conferring standing on a
person who shares actual care, control, and possession of a child
with that child’s parent for a period in excess of six months. I do not
believe a statute that merely confers standing on such a person is an
unconstitutional infringement on the liberty interest of the parent
who voluntarily shared care, control, and possession of the child for
a period exceeding six months.140
Nevertheless, taking In re K.K.C.’s holding another step, the Beau-
mont Court of Appeals in In re Wells found no loss of “legal control”
from the parent’s signing of a medical-emergency consent form in the
third party’s favor.141 The Court found that while the third-party par-
ent, Ruppert, had establish actual care and possession of M.J., the
child, Ruppert did not show she had “legal control.”142
Ruppert and Wells began living together before the birth of M.J.,
and after they quit living together, Ruppert spent “substantial periods
of exclusive periods of time with M.J.”143 However, after an analysis
citing to its opinion in In re K.K.C., the court found Wells had main-
tained “legal control.”144
Curiously, the Court did note that, “the desirability of compelling
Wells to allow Ruppert a right to visitation might be debatable, when
viewed from the child’s point of view.”145 This is noteworthy, as this
Court appears to have never discussed the best interest of the child
standard when determining standing issues.146 But, yet again, Chief
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 795. (McKeithen, C.J., dissenting).
139. Id. (McKeithen, C.J., dissenting).
140. Id. (McKeithen, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
141. In re Wells, 373 S.W.3d 174, 177–78 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2012, no pet.).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 177.
144. Id. at 178.
145. Id.
146. In reading a slew of case law from this court, the Author has yet to find a case
where the court considers the best interest of the child when determining standing.
The court did quickly dismiss its statement about the child’s point of view, by re-
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-3\TWL302.txt unknown Seq: 20 10-MAY-18 16:21
582 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
Justice McKeithen writes separately.147 This time he concurred only
“because In re K.K.C. is binding precedent of this Court,” but ex-
plained he stands by his dissenting opinion in In re K.K.C.148
Luckily, the Austin Court of Appeals does not agree with its Beau-
mont counterpart. In Jasek v. Texas Department of Family and Protec-
tive Services, the Court specifically criticized In re K.K.C.’s analysis of
the term “control,” arguing instead that the only adjective in the stat-
ute that modifies “control” is the word “actual;” “legal” is nonexistent
in the statutory text.149
In Jasek, the Department of Family and Protective Services
(“DFPS”) had taken custody of two children, K.E. and T.E., and sued
to terminate the biological parents’ rights.150 DFPS placed the chil-
dren with family friends, the Jaseks, and the children lived with them
for over two years during the pendency of the suit and thereafter.151
However, before the Jaseks were made permanent conservators, Mr.
Jasek tested positive for marijuana use, and DFPS removed the chil-
dren from the Jasek’s home.152
The Jaseks filed suit using section 102.003(a)(9) as its standing op-
tion,153 but the trial court concluded the Jaseks did not have “control”
of the children and struck their petition.154 The Austin Court of Ap-
peals felt that the Jaseks had “actual control” as required by the stat-
ute and that “legal control” was not a showing the Legislature
required.155 By combining the definitions of “actual” and “control,”
the court found section 102.003(a)(9) “reflect[s] the Legislature’s in-
tent to create standing for those who have, over time, developed and
maintained a relationship with a child entailing the actual exercise of
guidance, governance and direction similar to that typically exercised
by parents with their children.”156
The Court detailed four commonalities of those cases where “actual
care, control, and possession” had been collectively found:
minding its readers “Troxel does not allow a court to second-guess a fit parent’s deci-
sion.” Id. (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69).
147. Id. at 178–79 (McKeithen, C.J., concurring).
148. Id. (McKeithen, C.J., concurring).
149. Jasek v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 348 S.W.3d 523, 532, 535 (2011).
150. Id. at 526.
151. Id. at 527.
152. Id.
153. The Jaseks initially filed a “Petition in Intervention” using section 102.004(b)
with the intention of intervening in the termination suit; however, this suit was no
longer “pending.” The Appellate Court noted that because the Jaseks asserted gen-
eral standing through section 102.003(a)(9), they sufficiently gave DFPS “fair notice”
of their intention to bring an original SAPCR. Id. at 530.
154. Id. at 527.
155. Id. at 532–37.
156. Id. at 533 (citing Coons-Andersen v. Andersen, 104 S.W.3d 630, 636 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.)).
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[T]he person asserting standing (1) lived in the same home as the
child or lived in a home where the child stayed overnight on a regu-
lar and frequent basis, (2) made financial contributions benefitting
the child, (3) was involved with the child’s education, and (4) was
involved in matters involving the child’s general upbringing, like
health care, feeding, and clothing.157
The Court then attacked those determinations of the Fort Worth
and Beaumont appellate courts with relation to the meaning of “con-
trol.”158 The Court stated that it is not the judiciary’s job to add words
to a statute and that requiring a person to have a “legal right to con-
trol a child” would not only read nonexistent words into the text, but
“would [also] render the word ‘actual’ superfluous at best and mean-
ingless at worst.”159
Several facts showed the Jaseks maintained “actual control” over
the children for more than two years, and the Court found as a matter
of law that these facts established standing under section
102.003(a)(9).160 In closing, the Court noted that establishing standing
does not imply winning a case on the merits—it only signifies the right
to be heard in court.161
It is clear from these distinct cases that if the In re Sandoval Dad
had been faced with these tests, he would have failed to establish
standing under the In re K.K.C. and In re Wells standard. Dad did not
have “legal control” over the children because the adoptive mother
had not relinquished her parental rights to Dad.162 Because these
courts analyze legal control together with relinquishment of parental
rights, Dad could not have shown he had “legal control” over the
children.163
However, Dad likely would have established standing under the
Jasek standard. Dad lived in the same home as the children, supported
and provided for the children, quit his job to meet the children’s spe-
cial needs, and was involved in the children’s general upbringing;
taken collectively, these facts satisfy the Jasek court’s four common
threads to establish standing under section 102.003(a)(9).164
The Jasek court believed the Legislature intended to confer stand-
ing on a person who had created a relationship with the child for at
157. Id. at 534 (citing In re M.K.S.-V., 301 S.W.3d 460, 463–65 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2010, pet. denied); In re M.P.B., 257 S.W.3d 804, 809 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no
pet.); Smith v. Hawkins, No. 01-09-00060-CV, 2010 WL 3718546, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 23, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).
158. Jasek, 348 S.W.3d at 534–35.
159. Id. at 535.
160. Id. at 537.
161. Id. at 538.
162. See discussion supra Section II.
163. See discussion supra Section II; In re K.K.C., 292 S.W.3d 788, 793 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2009, orig. proceeding); In re Wells, 373 S.W.3d 174, 177–78 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2012, no pet.).
164. See discussion supra Section II; Jasek, 348 S.W.3d at 534.
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least six months “by virtue of that person’s actual care, control, and
possession of the child, as distinguished from a bare legal right of care,
control, and possession.”165 Arguably, this interpretation includes a
best interest of the child determination. But does that inclusion suffi-
ciently meet Texas’s priority, or should the best interest of the child
standard be a wholly separate determination when allowing a person
standing? An overview of the best interest of the child standard and
an analysis of a case where the court looked to the child’s best interest
before determining standing helps to answer this question.
IV. THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD STANDARD
(WHATEVER THAT MEANS)
Texas may not want to end its forward push into the future with
only broadening third-party standing rights. Perhaps Texas should also
seek to establish its children’s right to have parents. Texas could
achieve this by using familial and relationship terms, instead of biolog-
ical and legal terms. Then, the court could consider factors regarding
the best interest of the child standard in the same way children would
consider their own best interest. This is not to say courts should only
consider a child’s view, but courts must look at the scenario with the
child’s filtered lens.
The Texas Legislature should encourage courts to think about what
the child thinks, feels, and wants—not just needs. The child’s mental
health should have the same importance as physical health, and the
child’s rights should influence the court’s decision as much as those of
the parents. The question is how do we get there?
The Texas Family Code section 153.001 states:
(a) The public policy of this state is to:
(1) assure that children will have frequent and continuing con-
tact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the best
interest of the child;
(2) provide a safe, stable, and nonviolent environment for the
child; and
(3) encourage parents to share in the rights and duties of raising
their child after the parents have separated or dissolved their
marriage.166
The Texas Legislature has taken steps in the right direction for
courts to consider children’s rights. Thus, if parents request the courts’
involvement, it is the courts’ duty to make sure those three enumera-
tions in section 153.001 are met at the end of the suit.167 Accordingly,
165. Jasek, 348 S.W.3d at 535.
166. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §153.001 (emphasis added) (West Supp. 2017).
167. The Author feels that a duty is imposed because the Legislature took the time
to list its public policy—meaning it intended that the judges act on this policy.
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courts should focus on who can better serve the child’s interest, not
who has a better claim to the child.168 What, then, does the “best in-
terest of the child” mean?
A. Best Interest of the Child: Factors Currently Considered by
Texas Courts
Since 1966, Texas case law has shown that parents’ desires, acts, and
claims are secondary considerations to the best interest of the child,
reinforcing the Texas Family Code section 153.002, which states the
best interest of the child “shall always be the primary consideration of
the court.”169
In Holley v. Adams, the Texas Supreme Court established “factors”
for courts to consider in determining the “best interest of the child,”
specifically for a private-termination case; but over time, courts have
applied these factors in all suits involving children.170
These factors, commonly referred to as the “Holley” factors, set the
tone for what Texas courts may consider in this determination: the
child’s desires; the child’s emotional and physical needs now and in
the future; “the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in
the future”; “the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody”;
the programs available to assist those individuals to promote the
child’s best interest; “the plans for the child by th[ose] individuals . . .
seeking custody”; “the stability of the home”; the parent’s acts or
omissions that “may indicate that the existing parent-child relation-
ship is not a proper one”; and any excuse for the parent’s acts or
omissions.171
Case law defined these factors further by providing specific facts for
courts’ consideration. For example, if a child cannot voice its desires
because the child is too young to speak, courts may consider whether
the child is well-cared for by a parent, is bonded to that parent, and
has spent minimal time in the presence of that parent for determining
the first Holley factor.172 Courts considering the second and third Hol-
ley factors, regarding the child’s emotional and physical needs and the
emotional and physical dangers to the child, reiterate that perma-
nence is a paramount consideration.173 Courts have also considered
168. JOAN FOOTE JENKINS & RANDALL B. WILHITE, O’CONNOR’S TEX. FAM. LAW
HANDBOOK 484 (2015). See Mumma v. Aguirre, 364 S.W.2d 220, 221 (Tex. 1963)
(holding that the courts’ paramount concern in determining custody is the best inter-
est of the child, not righteousness of claims of others to custody).
169. See Bukovich v. Bukovich, 399 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. 1966); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 153.002 (West Supp. 2017).
170. See SAMPSON, TINDALL & ENGLAND, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 644 (2017).
171. Holley v. Adams, 554 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1967).
172. See In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d 222, 230 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003,
pet. denied).
173. See Edwards v. Tex. Dep’t. Protective & Regulatory Servs., 946 S.W.2d 130,
138 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.), disapproved of on other grounds by In re
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parental abilities and cooperation for factors two and three to deter-
mine if parents will give the child first priority when making joint deci-
sions regarding the child’s best interest.174
Factors four and five, available parenting programs and what plans
each parent has for the child, have been determined by the court con-
sidering a parent’s plan for living arrangements, education, after-
school care, financial support, and the like.175 Courts considering fac-
tors six and seven, which are excuses for parents’ acts or omissions
and whether those acts or omissions indicate an improper parent-child
relationship, have considered parental fitness, past conduct, and sub-
stance abuse.176
Over the years, courts’ decisions have been fact intensive, and have
provided the above listings as the basis of their best interest of the
child determinations. However, these determinations happen only af-
ter a plaintiff has established standing to sue. If the best interest of the
child is to be the focus, the primary goal of the courts in handling
cases involving children,177 why then do courts not consider it when
determining who has standing? The El Paso Appellate Court felt the
best interest of the child should play a role in determining standing; in
Doncer v. Dickerson, the Court determined third-party standing based
almost entirely on the child’s best interest after reviewing statutory
history.
B. Doncer v. Dickerson: Consideration of the Best Interest of the
Child Should Play a Role in Determining Standing
The Texas Family Code’s early versions had a statute almost identi-
cal to the Washington statute disputed in Troxel.178 The Washington
statute allowed “[t]he court [to] order visitation rights for any person
when visitation [served] the best interest of the child.”179 We know
now this type of broadly worded statute is unconstitutional,180 but
J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002); In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d at 230–31 (stating children
need security and permanency).
174. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §153.134(a)(2) (West Supp. 2017). See, e.g., Ber-
wick v. Wagner, 509 S.W.3d 411, 427 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. de-
nied) (instructing the jury to consider whether the parents will reach shared decisions
and encourage and accept a positive relationship between the child and the other
parent).
175. See, e.g., Reyes v. Reyes, 458 S.W.3d 613, 617 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no
pet.) (The father’s testimony showed no plans for living arrangements, proximity to
schools, or after school care, but only future speculations).
176. See, e.g., In re C.R.T., 61 S.W.3d 62, 66–68 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no
pet.) (noting a parent’s utter failure to support her children even though she had a
duty to do so by law indicated her appointment as a managing conservator would not
be in the child’s best interest).
177. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §153.002 (West Supp. 2017).
178. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §102.003 (cmt.) (West Supp. 2017).
179. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 2012).
180. See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
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what we can take from this history is that Texas’s legislative ancestors
knew the courts should have very broad discretion in determining a
child’s best interest.
However, courts strictly construed Texas’s earlier statute regarding
who had “an interest in the child.”181 Thus, the Legislature omitted
the overly broad standing option, and over time provided the several
fact-specific standing options we have today.182 Apparently the Legis-
lature simply forgot to add the courts’ discretion back into the mix by
referencing the best interest of the child in those specific standing
options.
In Doncer v. Dickerson, the El Paso Appellate Court reviewed
Texas’s standing history in detail.183 This Court considered the best
interest of the child in maintaining substantial relationships before de-
termining if a third-party parent has standing;184 the best interest of
the child standard is usually not discussed until the plaintiff has al-
ready established standing.185
In Doncer, Stepmother Doncer filed for conservatorship of her
stepson, Mikey, after the death of her husband—Mikey’s father.186
Dickerson, Mikey’s biological mother, and Doncer’s deceased hus-
band were Mikey’s joint-managing conservators, and Dickerson had
the right to establish Mikey’s primary residence.187 The biological par-
ents’ conservatorship agreement awarded Mikey’s father “possession
of Mikey 51 percent of the time in even-numbered years and nearly 48
percent in odd-numbered years.”188 The Court found “there were
seven months during which Mikey spent more than 50 percent of his
time with the Doncers, the last [month being] well within the ninety
day period before Doncer brought suit.”189
But the best part of the Appellate Court’s opinion came next. In-
stead of narrowly focusing on “actual care, control, and possession,”
going through the checks and balances regarding relinquishment of
rights and legal control, the court examined the best interest of the
child standard.190 This is unique because, as the Court explained only
one paragraph prior, lack of standing is the same as lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.191 If either is lacking, the court must dismiss the
181. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §102.003 (cmt.) (West Supp. 2017).
182. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §102.003 n.3 (West Supp. 2017).
183. Doncer v. Dickerson, 81 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.).
184. Id. at 353–54.
185. See discussion supra Sections III.B.1–3.
186. Doncer, 81 S.W.3d at 351.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 351–52.
189. Id. at 352–53.
190. Id. at 353–54.
191. Id. at 353.
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suit, and the best interest of the child standard is not implicated until
after standing has been established.192
The Appellate Court only briefly mentioned the best interest of the
child standard; but that mention came before establishing standing.193
What if courts considered the best interest of the child when deter-
mining standing? The trial judge in Doncer indicated his concern for
Mikey’s best interest to the Appellate Court:
I can’t imagine why it would be in the best interest of the child to
have the contact cut off. So . . . if there’s good cause shown by the
mother why it should be cut off, I certainly would be interested in
that; but, otherwise, I can’t imagine why there would just be a—an
arbitrary cutting off of that relationship.194
Of course, the trial judge then poses the existing problem: “Obvi-
ously, we’ll have to be guided by the statute and the case law, the
Code and the case law . . . .” Even still, the trial judge could not see
how terminating the relationship would be beneficial.195
In its conclusion, the Appellate Court recognized that the Supreme
Court had just decided Troxel, and thus, it remanded the case to the
trial court to determine Troxel’s impact on Doncer’s suit.196
Merely allowing any person with an “interest in a child” to have
standing upsets parents’ constitutional protections.197 But if Texas
keeps the standing limitations intact, as is, and adds a little discretion
for the judge to consider if third-party parent standing is in the best
interest of the child, would that violate the Constitution? As the
Doncer court reminded us, “[S]tanding to sue does not mean a right to
win, but merely a right to be heard in court. . . . [T]hose [third-party
parents] still will most often be faced with overcoming the parental
presumption in a contest for managing conservatorship with the
[other] parent.”198
C. Relationship Rights of Children: Healthy Relationships
Mean More
Considering the best interest of the child when determining third-
party standing is only the first step toward Texas achieving its goals.
Texas should also consider giving more weight to certain best-interest
factors, thereby emphasizing existing healthy relationships in the
child’s life. James G. Dwyer, author of The Relationship Rights of
192. Id.
193. Id. at 353–54.
194. Id. at 353.
195. Id. The trial judge then suggested that if there was “wiggle room” for Doncer,
the judge would have been inclined to grant standing. Id.
196. Id. at 362.
197. See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
198. Doncer, 81 S.W.3d at 356 (citing John J. Sampson, Vol. 93–2 ST. B. TEX. SEC.
REP.—FAM. L. 14 (1993)).
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Children, asks “whether the state’s decisions about children’s rela-
tional lives should be governed to a greater extent, and perhaps exclu-
sively, by rights of the children.”199
1. Mind of a Competent Child
Children do not have rights like adults; but what if children were
allowed interest-protection rights? Stated another way, what if the
courts, in protecting a child’s interest, were required to consider that
specific child’s best interest through that child’s filtered lens, without
parental influence? Professor Dwyer suggests that allowing “a pre-
sumption that children possess the same basic moral rights that adults
do” would require a transformation throughout family law in the
United States.200
He explains children’s rights would not be identical to adults’ rights,
merely “analogous and equally as strong.”201 It is generally assumed
that adults’ interests matter equally, regardless of societal status, and
that, empirically, adults feel their own interests outweigh other peo-
ples’ interests; specifically, adults feel they know what is best for their
“well-being.”202 Professor Dwyer submits that this assumption should
also apply to children and that if we are to respect children as equals,
we must recognize the importance of children’s relationships to their
“well-being.”203
2. A Right to Continue Healthy Relationships
The quality of particular relationships has a greater impact on a
child’s well-being than on an adult’s well-being.204 Arguably, then,
Texas should take greater precautions with the child’s welfare than
adults would take with theirs.205 The State should not determine chil-
dren’s relational lives by looking to other peoples’ rights or by afford-
ing the children’s welfare lesser weight.206 Instead, the State should
start focusing on the child, identifying with the child, and considering
the child’s interests as if the child were fully competent.207
199. JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 4, 23 (2006) (“A
complete account of children’s relationship rights against the state, therefore, requires
identifying not only those legal rules that explicitly confer such rights but also legal
rules that, though not speaking in terms of rights, implicitly confer rights on children
by imposing on state officials a duty owed to children to respect their wishes, to make
or act on an individualized assessment of their best interests, or to take particular
actions assumed to be generally conducive to their welfare.”).
200. Id. at 124–25.
201. Id. at 127.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 129.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 130.
207. Id. at 131.
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The State could accomplish this through the same manner used for
incompetent adults, by using surrogate agents to inquire into the
child’s “preferences, values, and disposition.”208 The best interest of
the child standard currently applied by Texas courts nearly follows
Professor Dwyer’s suggestion of maintaining a child’s filtered lens, but
as discussed below in this Article, the parental presumption still
trumps the best-interest consideration.209
In Texas, the child’s agent, usually the judge, may begin by acting as
an agent for the child, but then the judge must see if certain parental
rights override the child’s statutory interests.210 Still, Texas is one of a
minority of states that authorizes by statute nonlegal parents to peti-
tion for custody of a child.211 However, in several states, the best in-
terest of the child is the controlling consideration when deciding
nonlegal parents’ child custody cases, just as it is in a case between
two legal parents.212 Professor Dwyer thinks the minority states’ legis-
lators realize a social relationship with a caregiver may be more im-
portant to a child’s well-being than that of a biological relation or
legal status.213
It is worth considering why another set of persons with whom a
child’s right to a relationship is protected: siblings. Is there some ethe-
real bond between siblings? Something like that attachment between
mother and child? What exactly does the State feel is worthy of statu-
tory protection?214 The simple answer is: an existing relationship.215
V. CHILD’S RIGHT TO “PARENTAL” RELATIONSHIPS VS. THE
PARENTAL PRESUMPTION
Nearly 11 million children live with third parties in the United
States.216 If Texas intends on maintaining that the best interest of the
208. Id.
209. See discussion infra Section VI.
210. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §153.001 (West Supp. 2017). But see discussion
supra Section III.A.1.
211. Dwyer, supra note 199, at 50; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §102.003(a)(9), (11)
(West 2015).
212. Dwyer, supra note 199, at 50 (citing V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000))
(applying a best-interest standard and citing statutes from other states).
213. Id.
214. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §102.0045 (West Supp. 2017) (statute providing for
sibling standing); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.  §153.251(c) (West Supp. 2017) (statue pro-
viding that children from a marriage usually should not be separated during custody
disputes).
215. See, e.g., Beadles v. Beadles, 251 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana
1952, no writ) (discussing Texas’s preference against divided sibling conservatorship).
216. The Census Bureau estimated in 2009 that 3,083,000 children lived with no
parent, 5,317,416 children lived with a parent and stepparent, and 2,340,819 children
lived with a parent that was cohabitating with a third party. Rose M. Kreider & Renee
Ellis, Living Arrangements of Children: 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P70-126, 9–14
(June 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p70-126.pdf [http://perma.cc/J3TT-
ZQR9].
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child is its priority, then it must find a way to do so for all children,
including those who live with third-party, nonlegal parents. Establish-
ing that children have a right to continue a loving relationship with
whomever they know as their parent could allow Texas to achieve the
best interests of its children.
Clearly, from the discussion of the best interest of the child stan-
dard, these rights are not new.217 For centuries, courts have used the
parens patriae doctrine, meaning “parent of the country,” to act as
guardian to those legally disabled, e.g., adolescents.218 Judge Cardozo
has been given credit for defining the American understanding of this
doctrine:
[A judge] is to put himself in the position of a “wise, affectionate,
and careful parent,” and make provision for the child accord-
ingly. . . . He is not adjudicating a controversy between adversary
parties . . . . He “interferes for the protection of infants, qua infants,
by virtue of the prerogative which belongs to the Crown as parens
patriae.”219
Through Judge Cardozo’s declaration that the controlling concern
should be the child’s welfare, arguably the children have enjoyed cus-
tomary rights to have custody matters determined with a best interest
of the child standard for at least a century.220 However, courts find
tension when giving deference to both the parents’ and the children’s
rights.221 Should the parental presumption, as discussed above, over-
ride a child’s rights, or should the judiciary be allowed to balance
them?
Parenting skills are neither innate from the child’s birth nor develop
naturally—they must be learned.222 Without a sound parental role
model, a cycle of poor parenting can span generations.223 Yet Texas’s
court system assiduously applies the parental presumption, foreclosing
on claims by those already in parent-like roles who act in the child’s
best interest.224 Supreme Court dissenters recognized the parental
presumption is only helpful when the interests of parents and children
217. See discussion infra Section V.
218. Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 113, 120–23 (2009) (discussing parens patriae’s origin and
evolution).
219. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433–34 (1925) (citations omitted).
220. McLaughlin, supra note 218, at 129.
221. Id. at 135–37.
222. Judith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75
MARQ. L. REV. 569, 594 (1992). See also, Dwyer, supra note 189, at 2. (noting that
family-law scholars can point to legal rules that are detrimental to a child’s welfare,
giving as an example creating a parent-child relationship for newborn children solely
based on biological connection, with no consideration shown for the preparedness to
raise a child.).
223. See McMullen, supra note 222, at 594–95.
224. See generally, In re Sandoval, No. 04-15-00244-CV, 2016 WL 353010, at *1–5
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 27, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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align.225 In any of these scenarios, the children are the victims whose
rights (if they do indeed have any as United States citizens) appear to
have been violated.
The courts justify the parental presumption on the basis that most
parents act in the best interests of their children.226 In Texas, this pre-
sumption runs deep, and courts consistently discuss the natural affec-
tion flowing between parent and child.227 Unfortunately, this
presumption is faulty and often dismisses the custody claims of third-
party parents with whom the child has had a loving relationship, which
the legal parent usually established and encouraged.
VI. CONCLUSION
Troxel raises more questions than it answers. The analysis of
whether third-party standing might advance a child’s fundamental
rights is lacking. And we are left wondering whether the best interest
of the child standard constitutes a compelling state interest to over-
come a parent’s fundamental right to custody.228
Maybe the solution to this problem is simple. The First District
Court of Appeals of Houston considered if allowing third-party stand-
ing would be in the best interest of the child.229 What if part of judges’
consideration in determining third-party standing was the best interest
of the child? Of course, we know that the Troxel plurality requires
limitations, but currently, those statutorily imposed by the Texas Leg-
islature strip away all of the courts’ discretion.230
Once, a family law district judge said in a bench-bar conference,
“Give me something to work with; I want to help, but you have to give
me something so I can rule in your favor.”231 Judges are trying to pro-
vide justice and fulfill their roles in Texas’s courts of equity. Judges
should have a clear and inconspicuous way through the Family Code
225. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 136 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 268–70 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). By casting the
dispute as between legal parents and third parties, in both cases, a child was denied a
voice in the outcome, and the parental presumption failed the children. McLaughlin,
supra note 218, at 140.
226. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §153.131 (West Supp. 2017). See Lewelling v. Lewell-
ing, 796 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. 1990) (“The presumption that the best interest of a
child is served by awarding custody to a natural parent is deeply embedded in Texas
law.”).
227. See In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex. 2000).
228. See discussion supra Section III.A.2. Justice Kennedy recognized the best-in-
terest standard may be applied to certain third-party suits.
229. See discussion supra in Section V.
230. None of the fourteen standing options in chapter 102 of the Texas Family Code
allow a best interest of the child consideration for standing purposes. The courts can
consider the best interest only after the plaintiff has established standing. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §102.003(a) (West Supp. 2017).
231. Hon. Dennise Garcia, statement at Dallas County Family Law Bench Bar
2016.
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of using their discretion, within the bounds of the Constitution, when
deciding cases before them. If the child’s best interest is Texas’s prior-
ity, then courts should be allowed to consider those interests when
determining who has standing to bring a suit affecting the parent-child
relationship.
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